MARINE FIGHTING SQUADRON TWO TWENTY TWO,
23rd MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP, FORWARD ECHELON,
2nd MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FLEET MARINE FORCE.

WAR DIARY

.....Some of the enlisted personnel of VMF-222 were transferred to Marine Fighting Squadrons 223, and 224 and some were assigned to a group to be transferred to the States for further assignment to other fighting squadrons, which were to be organized at some future date. In addition, a number of other men were transferred to VMF-222, most of them being inexperienced in aviation. There were no changes in pilots. The three squadrons were attached to 21st Marine Aircraft Group, which changed its numerical designation to 23.
.....Inasmuch as there were only a total of nine pilots assigned to the fighter group, all were joined together to operate as one squadron, Capt. Haynes as senior officer in charge. This squadron was working as part of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command. Routine flights consisted of tactics, gunnery, night flights, and constant readiness for interception.

2 May, 1942

.....Routine flights.

.....No operations.

.....Conference and preparation for operation.

.....Familiarization flights in F2A-3, SNJ-3, and F4F-3A airplanes.

.....Local operations and maintenance.

.....Routine flights.

.....Routine day flight and night flight familiarization.

.....No flights. Conference on night interception.

.....No operations.

.....Two periods of gunnery flights. All pilots flew to Barking Sands Field, Kauai, T. H. to look over conditions for prospective night operations.

.....More gunnery and night flights.

.....Seven F2A-3 planes flown to Ford Island, Pearl Harbor and had ABD (IFF) sets installed.

.....Seven pilots and 29 enlisted men flown to Barking Sands Field for special temporary aviation duty in connection with training and operating as day or night interceptors controlled by Radar. Lt. Comdr. John H. Griffin, USN, with radio equipment and technicians also arrived to act as fighter director officer. In addition, a PBY-5A, piloted by Lt. (jg) Haber, arrived to work with the fighters in this problem. This PBY-5A was equipped with ASV (Radar).
.....The communications hook-up consisted of a transmitter and receiver station located near the planes at the field and another similar ground station at the radar, which was some 12 miles from the field.
Planes, pilots, and personnel were selected from Headquarters, 23rd MAG and from VMF squadrons 222, 223, and 224 but would act as one unit for the duration of this duty. Officers were as follows:
.....Maj. L. J. Bayler, Commanding
.....Capt. R. M. Haynes
.....Capt. J. F. Dobbin
.....Capt. John L. Smith
.....Capt. R. J. Morrell, Jr.
.....Capt. R. E. Galer
.....Capt. J. L. Mueller
.....1s tLt. M. R. Read
.....Lt.(jg) John B. Rowe (MC) USNR

.....Planes were spotted in the woods during daytime and hauled onto the field during hours of darkness where they could be more easily guarded against sabotage. Officers and men were quartered in Army barracks which were also being used by Naval personnel. We also used the local messing facilities. First flight operations consisted of dusk familiarization around the Island.

.....Conference between our forces and local Army officers to outline our operations and to establish cooperation with AA detectors. Flight operations consisted of another dusk flight circling the island and checking radios.

.....Continued radio tests to determine the best frequency. 4400 kcs. was the final decision which gave best reception and least interference ABD sets tested in each plane. First two sections took off at sunset and landed at 2030. There was very little moon and dim starlight.
The tactical organization consisted of Haynes and Dobbin in the first section, Smith and Morrell in the second, Galer end Mueller in the third, and Head as stand-by plane. One section was put on constant stand-by for immediate scramble. The pilots of this section remained in the vicinity of their planes for a 24 hour period, being relieved only for chow.

.....Radio calls were established. The ground station at the radar was "Jack”, the field station was "Base", and each plane was the pilot's last name.
.....Flew intercept problem in A.M. . with 3 F2As and the PBY, Communication from Jack to planes and back was uncertain and unreliable.
.....P.M. problem involved an intercept on each other 51 miles out. Communications greatly improved.
No night operation due to heavy clouds.

.....Intercept problem using 3 F2A s and PBY very successful. Daylight Flew afternoon interception between two sections of fighters.
.....Night operations called off due to radio silence.
.....Afternoon conference with Lt. Comdr. Griffin.

.....A.M. interception between 3 fighters and PBY. PBY directed one plane ahead 4 or 5 miles by means of ASV. Successful results.
.....P.M. interception between two fighter sections.
.....Ready section scrambled at 1920 and directed to North side of island. No interception due to poor visibility and heavy cloud formations. This section continued flight until after darkness, working interception with PBY and one fighter. About one-third moon. Secured at 2150.

.....Morning problem called off due to bad weather.
.....Night problem, two sections of VF close in—50 miles. Guns tested at night for performance and flash action. Just prior to landing first section, "Jack” announced a "bogey" (unidentified plane). One section was directed to intercept, another to circle the field, and remainder reserved on the ground. "Bogey" was identified before being intercepted.

.....A.M. problem, one fighter and PBY working to intercept one fighter section. Unsatisfactory results due to malfunctioning of PBY's ASV and excess speed of fighters over PBY.
.....1st. Lt. H. K. Marvin, radar school graduate, arrived and assigned as striker at radar post (Jack).
.....P.M. interception 2 VF sections very successful.
.....Capt. Morrell nosed up in landing due to defective brakes. Major repairs necessary.
2152, ready section scrambled to intercept bogey which was identified before fighters had been sent away from field.
.....No other night flights.

.....A.M., two VF sections intercept—not very successful.
.....P.M., PBY and fighter section tried closing on target from astern. Not very successful.
.....Night flight, PBY and one VF section. Fair results.

.....A.M., successful interception two VF sections.
.....P.M., one VF section used to calibrate AA’s 268 radar.
.....Night flying called off due to unfavorable weather.
.....Alert section scrambled at 1603 to intercept bogey bearing 263 distance 91 miles. Contacted and found friendly.

.....A.M., intercept 2 sections VF.
.....Lt. Col. W. J. Wallace arrived 1005 in an F2A-3 to replace damaged plane. Lt. Col. Wallace planned to remain a few days as an observer.
.....P.M., intercept with PBY and one VF section. Radio difficulty with ground stations.
Night flying. Two VF sections exercising at will with 3/4 moon. Pilots experimented with various conditions of visibility; up moon, down moon, above and below target, and with or without cloud background. There were almost as many opinions as there were conditions, however, all agreed that the target could not be seen more than 500 yards away under any condition except directly outlined against the moon.

.....A.M. interception PBY and one VF section.
.....P.M. interception two VF sections.
.....Night flying, PBY and one VF section, the PBY running without lights and the fighters with lights to avoid collision. Fighter pilots reported the PBY could not be seen until close up and that it was most readily detected from above by exhaust flame on top of wing. It was also found that a lean gas mixture reduced exhaust flame at least 75%.

.....A.M., problem 2 sections VF.
.....P.M., problem PBY directing one fighter to intercept VF section with poor results.
.....1430, USMC transport plane arrived with personnel and equipment to repair damaged plane. Lt. Col. Wallace returned to Ewa.
.....Night flying cancelled duo to heavy cloud formations.

.....A.M. flight, PBY and one fighter using ASV to intercept one VF section.
.....Night flight—PBY went out 100 miles and returned. One VF section scrambled on call from Jack. .....Interception not very successful. At same time some bogies appeared close to field and airborne section intercepted and contacted but could not close to identify. Bogey was identified the next day as friendly.
Secured at 2310.

.....A.M.—regular interception problem between two VF sections.
.....Night flight—one section intercepting PBY which was coming in from 100 miles out—not successful. .....Second section took off on scramble at 2150 and made successful interception.
.....Secured at 2330.

.....USMC transport plane arrived bringing seven additional men. Major Bayler returned to Ewa.
A.M. one fighter section and PBY, made successful interception using PBY's ASV.
.....1930, PBY took off, fighters off at 2000. Interception unsuccessful. PBY then flew two to three miles off coast and was tracked by searchlights while fighters experimented on various gunnery approaches on the illuminated target. Pilots reported that the target was readily visible from either above or below and that any normal daylight approach could be made provided the fighter was not headed into the light, also, that a minimum of searchlights was an advantage to the fighter.
Secured at 2200.

.....0900, one section of fighters and PBY took off. First problem was PBY trying to locate fighters by use of ASV, second, fighters locating PBY. Both were unsuccessful.
.....1930, PBY took off. One section of fighters off at 2000. Inter-ception unsuccessful although fighters were on a contact course when "Jack" lost control and stopped problem.
Full moon.

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